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1 Question 1 (Shapiro-Stiglitz).
1. Assume L workers and N firms. Workers maximise utility
U =
∫ ∞
t=0
e−ρtu(t)dt, ρ > 0, (1)
with
u(t) =

w(t)− e(t), if employed, not shirking (E);
w(t), if employed, shirking (S);
0, if unemployed (U).
(2)
Workers’ transition among the three states is given by
Transition Probability Notes
E → U P (t) = e−bτ b > 0, exogenous.
S → U P (t) = e−bτe−qτ q > 0, exogenous.
U → E P (t) = e−aτ a > 0, endogenous.
Firm’s profits at t are
pi(t) = F (eE(t))− w(t)[E(t) + S(t)], F ′(·) > 0, F ′′(·) < 0. (3)
Lastly, it is assumed that, in the absence of imperfect monitoring, there is full employment
(marginal product of labour is greater than labour effort):
eF ′(eL/N) > e. (4)
Let define the value of being in the i-th state (i = E,S, U) as
VE =
1
ρ
[
(w − e)− b(VE − VU )
]
; (5)
VS =
1
ρ
[
w − (b+ q)(VS − VU )
]
; (6)
VU =
1
ρ
[
a(VE − VU )
]
. (7)
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The firm set wages so that VE = VS , so that workers exert effort. So
1
ρ
[
(w − e)− b(VE − VU )
]
=
1
ρ
[
w − (b+ q)(VS − VU )
]
VE − VU = e
q
. (8)
This implies that wages need to be high enough that workers strictly prefer employment
to unemployment. Thus, workers obtain rents, the size of which is increasing in the cost of
exerting effort and decreasing in firm’s efficacy in detecting shirkers.
Substituting (5), (7) into (8), we obtain the optimal wage
w? = e+ (a+ b+ ρ)
e
q
. (9)
Since the economy is in steady state
a(L−NL) = NLb a+ b = Lb
L−NL.
Substituting this into (9) yields the no-shirking condition:
w? = e+
(
ρ+
Lb
L−NL
)
e
q
. (10)
Firms hire workers up to the point where MPL=w, that is the demand equation for labour,
LD : eF ′(eL) = w. (11)
Labour supply is horizontal at e up to L = L, and then vertical. Condition (4) implies
that the walrasian equilibrium is located on the vertical part of the labour supply curve.
Imperfect monitoring means that equilibrium occurs at the intersection between (11) and
(10).
2. (a) An increase in ρ shifts up the NSC locus: the wage needed to get workers to exert
effort is now higher. The new equilibrium has wN > w and NLN < NL. Intuitively,
since workers discount the future more, it matters less to them if they are caught
shirking, are fired and have to go through a period of unemployment.
(b) An increase in b shifts up the NSC locus. The new equilibrium has wN > w and
NLN < NL. Intuitively, since workers are more likely to lose their job anyway, the
value of being employed is lower; thus worker are not as concerned about being caught
shirking and fired.
(c) An multiplicative shock to the production function can be modelled as γF (e(w)L)
with γ > 1. This shift labour demand to the right. The new equilibrium has wN > w
and NLN > NL. Note that if efficiency wages were not present, inelastic labour
supply would mean that increases in technology would lead only to increases in the
wage, not to increases in employment.
(d) A rise in L shifts the labour supply function to the right. The NSC locus shifts down.
The new equilibrium has wN < w and NLN > NL. Intuitively, at a given level
of employment, if workers become unemployed, they are likely to stay unemployed
longer. Thus the cost of shirking is greater and firms can get away with paying a
lower wage to deter shirking.
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3. (a) The total number of unemployed workers is L − NL. If there is no shirking, the
number of workers becoming unemployed per unit time is NLb, which is also equal,
in steady state, to the number of workers becoming employed. Thus, the length of
time t? it takes to get a job is
t? =
L−NL
NLb
. (12)
(b) There is no uncertainty involved when calculating the value of becoming newly un-
employed, since workers know that it will take t? for being employed again. Thus
VU = e
−ρt?VE . (13)
(c) As in the baseline model, the firm chooses a wage so that VE = VS , which implies
VE − VU = e
q
. (14)
Substituting (13) into (14) yields
VE =
e
(1− e−ρt?)q . (15)
Solving equation (5) for w, and substituting the values in (13) and (15) yields
w? = e+
[
ρ
1− e−ρt? + b
]
e
q
, (16)
which is the NSC. Note from (12) that as NL→ L (as unemployment goes to zero),
w? → ∞. This is because t? → 0, and an individual who is caught shirking will be
rehired instantly. As NL → 0, on the other hand, w? → e + (ρ + b)e/q, which is
exactly the value of w? as NL→ 0 in the baseline model.
(d) In order to compare the equilibrium unemployment rates, comparison of the two NCS
loci is needed. If w? is higher, employment is higher. Intuitively, in both models, the
value of being newly unemployed comes prom the possibility of becoming employed.
For a given level of employment, the expected time to becoming employed is the same
in the two models (certain vs. uncertain, but still the same).
Since though e−ρt is convex in t, the uncertainty about the time it takes to get
employed again in the baseline model rises VU for a given VE relative to this model.
This means that firms must pay a higher wage in the Shapiro-Stiglitz model to deter
shirking. Thus, equilibrium unemployment is higher in the baseline model.
More formally:
e+
(
ρ+
Lb
L−NL
)
e
q
> e+
[
ρ
1− e−ρt? + b
]
e
q
ρ+
Lb
L−NL >
ρ
1− e−ρt? + b (17)
Using definition (12), we can write
NL =
L
1 + bt?
. (18)
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Substituting this into [L/(L−NL)]b gives:
Lb
L−NL =
Lb
L− L
1 + bt?
=
(1 + bt?)b
1 + bt? − 1 =
1 + bt?
t?
. (19)
Substituting (19) into (17) gives:
ρ+
1 + bt?
t?
>
ρ
1− e−ρt? + b
ρt? + 1 + bt? >
ρt?
1− e−ρt? + bt
?
ρt? − ρt?e−ρt? + 1− e−ρt? > ρt?
1− e−ρt? − ρt?e−ρt? > 0. (20)
We need to show that (20) actually holds. An expression of the form f(x) = 1−e−x−
xe−x > 0 ∀ x > 0, since f(0) = 0 and
∂f(x)
∂x
= e−x + xe−x − e−x = xe−x > 0 ∀ x > 0. (21)
(N.B. think of this as deriving f(x) = 1− g(h(x))−xg(h(x)) w.r.t. x, which is solved
by 0− g′(h(x))h′(x)− [xg′(h(x))(h′(x)) + g(h(x))].)
4. (Optional)
(a) We know that the firm maximises profit by picking a wage such that the elasticity of
effort w.r.t. wage is equal to one:
∂e
∂w
w
e
= 1 → ∂e
∂w
=
e
w
. (22)
Note that, since e = min[w/w?, 1],
∂e
∂w
=

1
w?
, for w = w?;
w/w?
w
=
1
w?
, for w < w?.
(23)
Thus equation (22) is satisfied for all w ≤ w?. For all these values, thus, cost of
effective labour is minimised. Given the assumption that the firm pays the highest
wage in this range, it chooses w = w?.
(b) i.
w? = w + a− bu. (24)
ii. Assume that there is positive unemployment, so that the firm is unconstrained
in its choice of the wage and pay w? = w. Since this is true for all firms, then
w = w, hence
w = w + a− bu
u =
a
b
. (25)
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The higher a (i.e. the higher above the average wage is the perceived fair wage),
the higher is the equilibrium unemployment rate. The lower is b (i.e. the less
responsive is the fair wage to unemployment) the higher is the equilibrium unem-
ployment rate.
If u = 0, then the fair wage is
w? = w + a. (26)
But if a > 0, this means that w < w? — firms are paying less than the fair
wage (assumptions are violated). Hence, so long as a > 0, there will be positive
unemployment.
iii. From (b)(ii), we can see that if a ≤ 0, equilibrium unemployment will be zero. If
a = 0, w? = w; if a < 0, w? < w, i.e. the representative firm, taking w as given,
wants to pay less than the average wage. Since workers are willing to work at any
positive wage, firms need only pay ε > 0 to get workers to be willing to work,
even with zero unemployment.
(c) i. Suppose the type-1 workers have a higher wage. Then w1 > (w1 + w2)/2. Thus,
the fair wage for type-1 workers is
w?1 =
(w1 + w2)
2
− bu1 < w1. (27)
But (27) implies that the firm is paying a wage higher than the fair wage to
a group that has unemployment. Thus there cannot be unemployment among
high-wage workers. High-wage workers are also the most productive. If it were
the low-productivity workers to earn the higher wage, there would be unemployed
high-productivity workers to be paid a lower wage. At a given wage the firm would
rather hire high-productivity workers (with higher MPL). Thus, higher wages are
earned by high-productivity workers.
ii. In equilibrium, there will be unemployment among low productivity workers. In
part (c)(i) we have shown that low-productivity workers must be the low wage
workers. This means that their wage is less than the average: w2 < (w1 +w2)/2.
Suppose there is no unemployment. Then the fair wage would be
w?2 =
(w1 + w2)
2
> w2. (28)
Equation (28) cannot be true, since the firm will not pay a wage below the fair
wage. Thus there must be some positive unemployment rate u2 > 0 such that
w2 = w
?
2 .
2 Question 2 (Implicit Contracts).
1. Firm’s expected profits are given by
E(pi) =
k∑
i=1
pi
[
AiF (Li)− wiLi
]
; (29)
workers’ utility is given by
E(u)
k∑
i=1
piui ui = U(Ci)− V (Li). (30)
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U(·) represent the utility from consumption, V (·) the disutility from working. Workers are
risk averse, hence
U ′(·) > 0; U ′′(·) < 0; V ′(·) > 0; V ′′(·) > 0. (31)
Let us suppose C = wL and define u0 the level of utility workers must attain to be willing
to work. There is no labour mobility one workers agree to a contract.
The firm’s maximum problem is
maxL =
k∑
i=1
pi
[
AiF (Li)− Ci
]
+ λ
[(
k∑
i=1
pi
[
U(Ci)− V (Li)
])− u0]. (32)
FOCs are
∂L
∂Ci
= −pi + λpiU ′(Ci) = 0
U ′(Ci) =
1
λ
; (33)
∂L
∂L
= piAiF
′(Li) = λpiV ′(Li)
AiF
′(Li) =
V (Li)
U ′(Ci)
. (34)
Workers’ real incomes are constant, so wages are rigid. L is higher when A is higher, so
the model implies that the wage is countercyclical. Long-term contracts imply that wage
does not play an allocative role.
The cost to the firm of varying the amount of labour it uses is proportional to V ′(Li), that
is increasing in Li, so the cost of labour to the firm is higher when unemployment is low.
This model hence fails to explain the relatively acyclical cost of labour.
In this framework, workers are not free to choose their labour supply given the wage.
Instead, the wage and employment are simultaneously specified to yield optimal risk-sharing
and allocative efficiency. When employment is low, the marginal disutility of work is low
and wage (w = C/L) is high. Thus workers wish that they could work more at the wage
the firm is paying. As a result, even though employment and wage are chosen optimally,
work are constrained in their labour supply.
2. (a) Suppose there are N states of the world. Firm’s expected profits are
pii =
N∑
i=1
[
AiF (Li)− [CEi Li + CUi (L− Li)]
]
. (35)
The expected utility of the representative worker is
E(pi) =
N∑
i=1
pi
[
Li
L
[
U(CEi )−K
]
+
L− Li
L
U(CUi )
]
. (36)
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The firm’s problem is:
max
Li,CEi ,C
U
i
L =
N∑
i=1
[
AiF (Li)− [CEi Li + CUi (L− Li)]
]
+ λ
[
N∑
i=1
pi
[
Li
L
[
U(CEi )−K
]
+
L− Li
L
U(CUi )
]
− u0
]
(37)
(b) FOCs are:
∂L
∂Li
= piAiF
′(Li)− piCEi − piCUi + λpi
1
L
[
U(CEi )−K
]− λpi 1
L
U(CUi ) = 0; (38)
∂L
∂CEi
= −piLi + λpiLi
L
U ′(CEi ) = 0; (39)
∂L
∂CUi
= −pi(L− Li) + λpiL− Li
L
U ′(CUi ) = 0. (40)
Solving (39) for U ′(CEi ) gives
U ′(CEi ) =
L
λ
. (41)
This implies that marginal utility of consumption and consumption for employed
workers is constant across states. Solving (40) for U ′(CUi ) gives
U ′(CUi ) =
L
λ
. (42)
Marginal utility of consumption is the same for both employed an unemployed workers,
hence
CE = CU (43)
(c) The unemployed workers are better off. They consume the same amount as the
employed workers and do not suffer the disutility of work, K.
3. (a) With efficient contracts, C = wL is constant across states. In addition, employment
is increasing in A, so that LG > LB . Given A, and given the fact that wL is constant,
profit is increasing in employment. Thus, when the true state is AB , the firm is better
off announcing that A = AG and employing LG. When AG is true, the firm is better
off stating the truth. Hence, the efficient contract is not incentive-compatible.
(b) The incentive-compatibility constraint that is binding is that the firm not prefer to
claim that A = AG when in fact A = AB . This requires:
ABF (LB)− CB = ABF (LG)− CG. (44)
The left-hand side of equation (44) is the firm’s profit in the bad state if it announces
the bad state, whereas the right-hand side of (44) is the firm’s profit in the bad state
if it announces the good state.
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The Lagrangian then is:
L =
ABF (LB)− CB
2
+
AGF (LG)− CG
2
+ λ1
[
U(CB)− V (LB)
2
+
U(CG)− V (LG)
2
− u0
]
+ λ2
[
ABF (LB)− CB −ABF (LG) + CG
]
. (45)
FOCs are:
∂L
∂CB
= −1
2
+
1
2
λ1U
′(CB)− λ2 = 0; (46)
∂L
∂CG
= −1
2
+
1
2
λ1U
′(CG) + λ2 = 0; (47)
∂L
∂LB
=
1
2
ABF
′(LB)− 1
2
λ1V
′(LB) + λ2ABF ′(LB) = 0; (48)
∂L
∂LG
=
1
2
AGF
′(LG)− 1
2
λ1V
′(LG)− λ2AGF ′(LG) = 0. (49)
Summing up (46) and (47) yields
− 1 + λ1
2
U ′(CB) +
λ1
2
U ′(CG) = 0 λ1 =
2
U ′(CB) + U ′(CG)
.
Substituting this into (46) yields
λ2 =
U ′(CB)− U ′(CG)
2[U ′(CB) + U ′(CG)]
. (50)
Substituting (49) and (50) into (48) gives
1
2
ABF
′(LB)− V
′(LB)
U ′(CB) + U ′(CG)
+
EBF
′(LB)[U ′(CB)− U ′(CG)]
2[U ′(CB) + U ′(CG)]
= 0
ABF
′(LB)[U ′(CB) + U ′(CG)]− 2V ′(LB) +ABF ′(LB)[U ′(CB)− U ′(CG)] = 0
2ABF
′(LB)U ′(CB) = 2V ′(LB)
ABF
′(LB =
V ′(LB)
U ′(CB)
). (51)
Hence, in the bad state, the marginal product and the marginal disutility of labour
are equated.
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(c) Substituting (46) and (47) into (49) yields
1
2
AGF
′(LG)− V
′(LG)
U ′(CG) + U ′(CB)
+
EGF
′(LG)[U ′(CG)− U ′(CB)]
2[U ′(CG) + U ′(CB)]
= 0
AGF
′(LG)[U ′(CB) + (′(CG))]
2
− ABF
′(LG)[U ′(CB)− U ′(CG)]
2
= V ′(LG)[
AG
2
+
AB
2
+
AGU
′(CB)−ABU ′(CB)
2U ′(CG)
]
F ′(LG) =
V ′(LG)
U ′(CG)[
AG − AG
2
+
AB
2
+
AGU
′(CB)−ABU ′(CB)
2U ′(CG)
]
F ′(LG) =
V ′(LG)
U ′(CG)[
AG +
AG
2
(
U ′(CB)
U ′(CG)
− 1
)
− AB
2
(
U ′(CB)
U ′(CG)
− 1
)]
F ′(LG) =
V ′(LG)
U ′(CG)[
AG +
AG −AB
2
U ′(CB)− U ′(CG)
U ′(CG)
]
F ′(LG) =
V ′(LG)
U ′(CG)
(52)
The contract must involve LG > LB and must therefore have CG > CB to be incentive-
compatible. Since CG > CB , U ′(CB) > U ′(CG) and so the second term in brackets
is positive. Thus AGF ′(LG) < V ′(LG)/U ′(CG). The marginal disutility of work
exceeds the marginal product of labour in the good state. In other words, there is
overemployment.
(d) Given the fact that there is no unemployment in the bad state and overemployment in
the good state, this model does not appear to be helpful in understanding the high level
of average unemployment. But since it is in the good state that the overemployment
occurs, the model does suggest a reason that employment might be procyclical and
more responsive to shocks than under symmetric information.
4. (Optional) This model assumes that there are two groups of workers: outsiders and
insiders, and that the firm only bargains wage (as a function of the state Ai) with insiders.
Firm’s profit is given by
pi = AF (LI + LO)− wILI − wOLO. (53)
It is assumed that insiders bargain so that they are always fully employed (i.e. LI = LI)
and their utility only depends upon salary:
uI = U(wI). (54)
Assuming outsiders’ salary is wO = RwI with 0 < R ≤ 1, firm’s maximum problem is
maxL =
k∑
i=1
[
AiF (LI + LO,i)− wI,iLI −RwI,iLO,i
]
+ λ
[ k∑
i=1
piU(wI,i)− u0
]
. (55)
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FOCs are:
∂L
∂LO,i
= pi[AiF
′(LI + LO,i)−RwI,i] = 0
AiF
′(LI + LO,i) = RwI,i; (56)
∂L
∂wI,i
= −pi(LI + LO,iR) + λpiU ′(wI,i) = 0
U ′(wI,i) =
LI + LO,i
λ
. (57)
Hence, total labour is chosen at the value that equalises marginal cost and marginal prod-
uct. This is because outsiders are not involved in the bargaining process, while the firm
and insiders maximise together their surplus. Marginal utility is increasing in LO,i, hence
salary is anticyclical. The firm does not set the wage at its equilibrium value.
3 Question 3 (Search and Match).
1. The economy consists of workers and jobs. Each of the workers (that have mass 1) can
be employed or unemployed. Employed workers produce an exogenous, constant amount y
per unit time and receive an endogenous wage w(t) per unit time. Workers are risk neutral
and have discount rate r > 0. Utility is given by
ut =
{
w, (E);
0, U.
(58)
Any job, filled or vacant, involves a constant exogenous cost c > 0 per unit time. Thus
profits are
pi =
{
y − w − c, (F=E);
−c, V. (59)
For positive values of U , V the number of matches are given by the matching function:
M(t) =M(U(t), V (t)), MU > 0, MV > 0. (60)
As in the Shapiro-Stiglitz model, there also is turnover: jobs end at an exogenous rate λ
per unit time. Thus, assuming that all meetings lead to hires, the dynamics of E are given
by
E˙ =M(U(t), V (t))− λE(t). (61)
Then, the job-finding rate a (U → E) and the vacancy-filling rate α (V → F) are
a(t) =
M(U(t), V (t))
(U(t)
(62)
α(t) =
M(U(t), V (t))
(V (t)
(63)
(64)
We assume a Cobb-Douglas form for the matching function:
M(U(t), V (t)) = kUβV γ (65)
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Hence,
E˙ = kUβV γ − λE(t). (66)
‘Returns’ of each state is given by:
rVE(t) = w(t) + V˙E(t)− λ[VE(t)− VU (t)] (67)
rVE(t) = V˙U (t)− a(t)[VE(t)− VU (t)] (68)
rVF (t) = [y − w(t)− c] + V˙F (t)− λ[VF (t)− VV (t)] (69)
rVV (t) = −c+ V˙V (t) + α(t)[VF (t)− VV (t)] (70)
And wage is chosen so that agents have the same return:
VE − VU = VF − VV . (71)
Lastly, since vacancies can be created costlessly,
VV (t) = 0 ∀ t. (72)
We will focus on steady-state values for simplicity. Subtracting (66) and (67) yields
VE − VU = w
a+ λ+ r
; (73)
Similarly, (68) and (69)
VF − VV = y − w
α+ λ+ r
. (74)
Using (70) we obtain
w =
(a+ b+ r)y
a+ α+ 2λ+ 2r
. (75)
For a = α, worker and firms divide output equally, while for a > α workers have an
advantage, since finding a job is easier. The value of a vacant place is then defined as:
rVV = −c+ α(VE − VU )
= −c+ α y − w
α+ λ+ r
= −c+ α y
a+ α+ rλ+ 2r
. (76)
Let us define a (eq. 62), α (eq. 63) in terms of E. Since in steady state, E˙(t) = 0,
M(U(t), V (t)) = λE, and since M(U(t), V (t)) = kUβV γ , we can derive
a =
λE
1− E ; (77)
V =
[
λE
kUβ
]1/γ
; (78)
αk1/γ(λE)(γ−1)/γ(1− E)β/γ . (79)
This model implies that a is increasing in E, while α is decreasing. Thus rVV is a decreasing
function of E. As E → 1, a→∞, α → 0; hence rVV → −c. Similarly, for E → 0, a→ 0,
α→∞, and rVV → y − c.
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The equilibrium is determined by the intersection of (75) and the free-entry condition (71).
This yields
− c+ α(E)
a(E) + α(E) + 2λ+ 2r
y = 0. (80)
2. (a) Given the equation for rVV (75), an increase in λ directly reduces rVV for a given
level of employment. However, since both α (76) and a (78) depend on λ. Specifically,
a rise in λ increases a, and reduces α. So
∂rVV
∂λ
< 0; (81)
∂rVV
∂a
< 0; (82)
∂rVV
∂α
=
y(a+ α+ 2λ+ 2r)− αy
(a+ α+ 2λ+ r2)2
=
y(a+ 2λ+ 2r)
(a+ α+ 2λ+ 2r)2
> 0. (83)
All effects then work in the same direction and rVV is reduced for a given E. Thus
the locus shifts down. The new equilibrium has EN < E.
(b) Since a and α do not depend on r, we simply need to determine
∂rVV
∂r
=
−2αy
(a+ α+ 2λ+ 2r)2
< 0. (84)
rVV is reduced for a given E. Thus the locus shifts down. The new equilibrium has
EN < E.
(c) a does not depend on k. α is increasing in k and, from equation (82) we know that
rVV is increasing in α. Thus, an increase in k, the effectiveness of matching, shifts up
the rVV locus. The new equilibrium has EN > E.
3. (a) In a steady state, M(U, V ) = λE(N). The number of matches per unit time must
equal the number of jobs at that end per unit time. In addition, the number of
unemployed workers is U = 1−E(N), and the number of vacancies is V = N −E(N).
Substituting these expressions for U , V into the matching function, and setting it
equal to λE(N), yields
λE(N) = k[1− E(N)]β [N − E(N)]γ . (85)
To find how E varies with N , differentiate both sides w.r.t. N :
λE′(N) = kβ[1− E(N)]β−1[N − E(N)]γ [−E′(N)] + kγ[1− E(N)]β [N − E(N)]γ−1[1− E′(N)]
=
kβ[1− E(N)]β [N − E(N)]γ [−E′(N)]
1− E(N) +
kγ[1− E(N)]β [N − E(N)]γ [1− E′(N)]
N − E(N)
=
βλE(N)
1− E(N)
[−E′(N)]+ γλE(N)
N − E(N)
[
1− E′(N)]
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E′(N)
[
1 +
βE(N)
1− E(N) +
γE(N)
N − E(N)
]
=
γE(N)
N − E(N)
E′(N) =
γE(N)
N − E(N)
1 +
βE(N)
1− E(N) +
γE(N)
N − E(N)
E′(N) =
γE(N)[1− E(N)]
[N − E(N)][1− E(N)] + βE(N)[N − E(N)] + γE(N)[1− E(N)] . (86)
(b) Since welfare is given by
W (N) = yE(N)− cN, (87)
then the change due to the number of jobs is given by
W ′(N) = yE′(N)− c. (88)
Substituting this into (86) yields
W ′(N) =
γE(N)[1− E(N)]
[N − E(N)][1− E(N)] + βE(N)[N − E(N)] + γE(N)[1− E(N)]y − c.
(89)
(c) To simplify notation, we are going to drop the ’EQ’ subscripts on N , recalling that N
is the number of jobs in equilibrium. In the case of r = 0, equation (80) becomes
c = α
y
a+ α+ 2λ
. (90)
Substituting the values of a, α yields
c =
λE(N)/V (N)
λE(N)/[1− E(N)] + 2V (N)[1− E(N)]y
=
E(N)[1− E(N)]
E(N)V (N) + E(N)[1− E(N)] + 2V (N)[1− E(N)]y
=
λE(N)/V (N)
E(N)[N − E(N)] + E(N)[1− E(N)] + 2[N − E(N)][1− E(N)]y. (91)
(d) Using the definitions of U(N) = 1−E(N) and V (N) = N −E(N), equation (91) can
be rewritten as
c =
E(N)U(N)
E(N)V (N) + E(N)U(N) + 2V (N)U(N)
y. (92)
Substituting (92) into (89) gives the following expression for how the welfare changes
with equilibrium employment:
W ′(N) = y
[
γE(N)U(N)
V (N)U(N) + βE(N)V (N) + γE(N)U(N)
− E(N)U(N)
E(N)V (N) + E(N)U(N) + 2V (N)U(N)
]
. (93)
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After obtaining a common denominator, the sign of W ′(N) will be determined by the
sign of
γU(N)[E(N)V (N) + E(N)U(N) + 2V (N)U(N)]− U(N)[V (N)U(N)
+ βE(N)V (N) + γE(N)U(N)]
= (γ − β)U(N)E(N)V (N) + (γ − γ)E(N)U(N)2 + (2γ − 1)V (N)U(N)2
= U(N)V (N)[(γ − β)E(N) + (2γ − 1)U(N)]
= (γ − β)E(N) + (2γ − 1)(1− E(N))
= (2γ − 1) + (1− γ − β)E(N). (94)
If β+ γ = 1 (i.e. matching has constant returns), the sign of W ′(N) is determined by
the sign of 2γ − 1:
• If γ > 1/2, → W ′(N) > 0, and thus an increase in equilibrium number of jobs
would raise welfare;
• If γ < 1/2, → W ′(N) < 0, and thus an increase in equilibrium number of jobs
would reduce welfare;
If γ = 1/2, the sign of W ′(N) is determined by the sign of 1− γ−β = 1/2−β. Thus:
• If β < 1/2, → γ + β < 1 (i.e. matching has decreasing returns), → W ′(N) > 0,
and so equilibrium unemployment is inefficiently high;
• If β > 1/2, → γ + β > 1 (i.e. matching has increasing returns), → W ′(N) > 0,
and so equilibrium unemployment is inefficiently low.
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